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Abstract. The paper discusses the changes in the global energy balance and the resulting 
geopolitics, which have in the recent years emerged as a result of the interplay of factors such as 
the rapidly increasing world’s energy consumption and the shift of the source of consumption 
eastwards to China and India. The apparent shortage of oil is exemplified by the “peak oil” theory, 
signalling a global struggle for oil and the need for new oil production, despite the apparent 
investor’s insecurity to commit under the current geopolitical and economic conditions. Against 
the backdrop of these disconcerting factors, the authors considered the emergence of shale gas, as 
a new and abundant energy source that may redirect the energy geopolitics towards more 
comfortable outcomes.  
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Introduction 
Energy supply has long played a prominent role in world’s international affairs. 
The forces of globalisation, market liberalisation and technology have created a 
global economic engine that is now engaging massive populations in the 
developing world, especially in Asia.  
As the globalised markets of today have been very much energised by the 
affordable and available transportation fuels, oil and natural gas are expected to 
dominate the world geopolitics in the years to come. In addition, with the 
economic rise of China and India, the world’s energy balance has undergone 
substantial changes over the last few decades, in terms of both demand increase 
and its “shift eastwards” – changes that will without doubt further enhance the 
role of energy in international politics, moving the energy security up the 
political agenda and intensifying the campaign for the remaining resources.  
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The global struggle over energy, especially the control over the flow of oil and 
gas from the Caspian region to the markets in Europe and United States, is only 
expected to intensify.  
While there appears to be an urgent need to invest in new oil resources, 
especially in the OPEC region, the current economic and geopolitical climate 
combined with environmentalist’s decarbonisation desires and the corresponding 
agendas makes the potential investors reluctant to engage in energy projects.  
In the last few years, however, amidst the turbulent and worrying manifestations 
of the global energy reality, there came the shale gas shock – a new, abundant, 
uniformly distributed, inexpensive, clean and reliable energy resource emerged 
that is destined to transform the world’s energy prospects.   
This study examines these changes and how they affect the global energy 
balance and the underlying geopolitics. 
Geographical shift of consumption 
In spite of the fact that there is no imminent shortage of world energy supply, the 
sharp increase in consumption is often quoted as a major concern from both the 
geopolitical and environmental viewpoints. World’s energy consumption is 
currently around 500 exajoules/year, or on average 55 kWh per person per day. 
By 2035 the worldwide requirement for primary energy is expected to rise by 
49% relative to 2007 (DOE EIA, 2010, page 1).  
However, it is the shift in the source of consumption, and particularly of the oil 
consumption, that made substantial changes to the world energy balance, which 
can naturally be followed by a shift in the geopolitical and economic power from 
West to East. This process may be gradual, but its potential consequences are 
profound. The economic crisis in the West, if it continues, can only accelerate 
the trend, and it may turn out that the year 2008 was the turning point. 
As shown in Figure 1, the energy consumption of the OECD countries is 
expected to rise only marginally by 2035. The main increase will occur in the 
developing nations of Asia, and especially in China. The non-OECD nations 
account for 84% of growth in energy use between 1990 and 2035 (DOE EIA 
2011, Figure 50). While China’s share of the global energy consumption was 
only 8% in 1990, compared to US’s 24%, China is expected to equal US in 2015 
at about 18% of world’s energy, and to dominate in 2035 at 24%, compared to The changing geopolitics of energy 
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USA’s expected 16% share. Both countries will undoubtedly rate their energy 
security as a national interest of the highest priority
2.  
 
Figure 1 World energy demand projection (DOE EIA, 2010) 
 
As regards its oil consumption, China emerged from being a net oil exporter in 
the early 1990s to become the world’s third-largest net importer by 2006. Its oil 
consumption growth accounted for about a third of the world’s oil consumption 
growth in 2009 (EIA, 2010). 
 
China consumed 8.3 million barrels per day (Mbpd) in 2009, while producing 
only 4 Mbpd. Its import in 2009 was 4.3 Mbpd, compared to US’s 9.6 Mbpd 
(EIA, 2010).  
Chinese oil demand will have reached 9.6 Mbpd in 2011, and its imports will 
rise to 5.6 Mbpd. At this growth rate Chinese oil imports may reach that of the 
US by year 2016.   
China in the energy market - a different game? 
The rise of China, as an influential consumer and a possible US’s competitor for 
the remaining oil, has several important geopolitical consequences. In addition 
to the emerging struggle for resources and the risk of crossing the boundaries of 
diplomatic contests, the specific Chinese campaign for resources creates a 
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peculiar economic effect – a change in energy trading methods, which some 
authors describe as “market suppression”, caused by special bilateral deals.  
China’s approach to energy markets in Africa and Central Asia often involve 
special, not so transparent government-to-government agreements, which is in 
contrast with the market-based approach to energy security, favoured by the 
market economies. It is feared, largely in the West, that the grants, special loans 
and infrastructure development projects that the Chinese government routinely 
offers to its resource-rich business partners distort the workings of the market 
(Klare, 2008).  
However, some authors assert that this Chinese practice is neither exceptional 
nor at all harmful, arguing that if the Chinese energy sector bring more supplies 
onto the global market, all consumers will benefit in the long term (Victor, 
Yueh, 2010). These authors hope that China will appreciate that the flows of the 
new supplies will be more reliable if they came from countries with well 
functioning governments. It is believed that to enable such development in 
Chinese attitude towards energy markets, the investment standards should be 
developed that align China’s interests in its energy security with the Western 
norms of well-functioning markets.  
The response – increased awareness of energy security 
The five largest energy consumers, and at the same time the economically 
strongest powers and actors on the world geopolitical map (US, China, EU, 
India, Japan), are all short of conventional energy supply. Government’s concern 
about the energy security causes them to take energy to the top of their political 
agendas. The fragile government become sensitive to lobbying in favour of one 
option or the other. For example: 
−  Following Fukushima nuclear reactor explosions, Germany decided to 
abandon nuclear power by 2022 (Pidd & Goldenberg, 2011). The 
announcement came only months after Angela Merkel’s government 
decided in autumn 2010 that their nuclear power stations should 
continue to operate until 2035, which overrode a decision to quit nuclear 
energy by 2022 made by the government of Social Democrats and 
Greens in 2001.  
−  At the same time France made a new commitment to nuclear power 
(Willsher, 2011) 
−  In the UK, the Severn Estuary tidal power project was abandoned (UK 
Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010).  The changing geopolitics of energy 
  129
Some of these moves are in sharp contrast with the environmentalist’s desire to 
switch to low-carbon energy and many governments verbal agreement to action 
on this, in spite of expert’s warning that the switch may be a very slow process 
with a limited effect (Kramer and Haigh, 2009). 
The supply side - world oil reserves 
Although there is no imminent oil shortage on the world stage, the “peak oil” 
alarmists are still active. The scare mongering is assisted by the lack of 
transparency concerning world’s oil reserves and the perception of a production 
“peak”, followed by a decline. The so called “Hirsch report” has been quite 
influential in this respect (Hirsch et al., 2005).  
The world’s oil consumption is expected to be around 88 million barrels per day 
(Mbpd) in 2011, providing around 34% of the global energy demand. Of this, 
23% will be consumed in the USA, 10% in China, 18% in the EU and 5% in 
Japan. (EIA 2011a, Table 3a)  
The proven oil reserves are estimated at 1.3 trillion barrels. The distribution of 
the reserves is shown in Figure 2 (DOE EIA, 2010). Relatively few fields have a 
major influence on global crude oil supply, and their gradual decline is an area 
of concern. 
 
Figure 2. World oil reserves distribution, billion barrels (DOE EIA, 2010) 
 
As the oil production in the non-OPEC countries is expected to increase only 
marginally between 2010 and 2030, it is the call on OPEC to provide for the new 
production. 
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The production rates expected from OPEC vary from analyst to analyst. OPEC’s 
own predictions quote 49 in 2030 (Hamel, 2007), while DOE predicts 47 Mbpd 
by 2035 (DOE EIA, 2010). 
Assuming a 1.5 %/year depletion
3 rate of the existing fields, the OPEC’s 
projected shortage in 2030 will be around 16.5 Mbpd, equal to 150% of the 
current production of Saudi Arabia. 
Propensity to Invest - Investing in the Uncertain World 
There appears to be an urgent need to invest in new oil, and it is the investment, 
not the resource that seems to be critical. However, the political and economical 
instabilities set constraints on the propensity to invest, and have caused apparent 
investor’s reluctance.  
While most of the oil reserves are in regions that are politically unstable (Figure 
2), it is prohibitively expensive to invest in oil fields in stable locations. 
According to OPEC, the expansion of non-OPEC capacity is on average 2-3 
times more costly than for OPEC, with this gap widening over time, as costs in 
non-OPEC regions gradually rise faster than in OPEC. The highest-cost region is 
the OECD, which also experiences the highest production decline rates (Hamel, 
2007). 
Another investor’s dilemma is that the producing countries may question if the 
demand is certain to justify the large investments. The environmentalists 
discourage new oil investment, and in particular the “climate change” activists 
doubt future fossil fuel usage, albeit without offering a clear alternative. 
Finally, the intrinsic instability in energy pricing, due to the currently prevailing 
speculative mechanisms of oil pricing makes planning and deciding about 
energy investments increasingly more difficult.  
For a couple of decades, until about 2004, the price of oil had been basically 
determined by OPEC, through an administered system of fixed prices. Since 
early 1980s, large producers moved to a “benchmark” pricing system, trading in 
crude futures. This brought in new players from the financial sector, including 
large hedge fund speculators and index investors. As the price of oil has become 
                                                            
3 Note that the assumed depletion rate of 1.5% is conservative – a more detailed analysis of the 
depletion patterns is to be found in (Höök et al., 2009)  
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commodities, the main drivers of price have increasingly included financial 
market indicators, such as equities and exchange rates. 
 
Shale gas revolution 
The breakthrough in natural gas supply in North America is one of the most 
important changes in the global energy image. Several old and new technologies 
combined to enable shale gas extraction: hydraulic “fracking” of rock to open 
pores and allow extraction, improved horizontal drilling, improved seismic 
exploration, and, most importantly, gas extraction from deep shale by using 
“slick” (low viscosity) water and send mixture to fracture the rock combined 
with horizontal drilling to expand the reach of the well (Ridley, 2011).  
Oil and gas companies have more than doubled the discovered shale gas 
resource base in North America in the past three years and they have scaled-up 
production dramatically. Total potential resources are now thought large enough 
to meet current consumption levels for about a century. In an unprecedented 
move, the Royal Dutch Shell declared to have become a “gas company” (Lestak, 
2011). 
As shale gas is uniformly distributed, other countries are now encouraged to 
search for new gas resources themselves. The global unconventional gas 
resource base must still be proven, but with the EIA estimating a potential 
recovery worldwide at 185 trillion cubic meter (tcm) (EIA, 2011), it will clearly 
be a game-changer.  
To put this shale gas resource estimate in some perspective, world proven 
reserves of natural gas as of January 1, 2010 are about 187 tcm, and world 
technically recoverable gas resources are about 450 tcm (excluding shale gas). 
Thus, adding the identified shale gas resources to other gas resources increases 
total world technically recoverable gas resources by over 40 percent to 635 tcm.   
The largest addition comes from the USA – the estimates vary from 24 tcm 
(EIA, 2011), to 31 tcm (IHS CERA, 2010). In Europe, Poland is currently 
quoted as richest in shale gas reserves, followed closely by France. The 
estimates for Poland vary from 1.3 tmc (Wood Mackenzie
4) to 5 tmc (EIA). As a 
reference, Poland’s natural gas consumption is 14 billion m
3/year, and EU 
demand is about 550 billion m
3/year. 
                                                            
4 The original publication is obscure, but see: 
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The success of shale gas projects that are already in the US underway will give 
governments, investors and consumers the confidence to commit to natural gas 
in the long term. It is not difficult to take these forecasts one step further and 
foresee that natural gas may gradually replace coal as the power generation fuel, 
and also replace oil as land transportation fuel via gas-to-liquid (GTL) partial 
oxidation, followed by the Fischer Tropsch process
5. 
Conclusion 
Two opposing movements dominate the world energy outlook: (1) fear of 
shortage of energy, especially shortage of oil, and the geopolitical contest for the 
remaining resources; (2) a dramatic increase in the availability of 
unconventional natural gas as world’s primary energy resource for centuries to 
come.  
How these two forces will be reconciled remains to be seen. However, the 
world’s energy problems are relieved by shale gas revolution to an extent 
unimaginable only several years ago. A switch from coal to gas and from oil to 
gas appears imminent, in a word in which the choice of fuel for electricity 
production seems to be gas, and the future of transportation the electric car.  
The optimism in world’s energy affairs has been desperately out of fashion over 
the last twenty or so years, although there has never been a clear and a scientific 
rationale behind such sentiments and beliefs. The shale gas solution to world’s 
energy problems will certainly encounter formidable opposition from oil, coal, 
nuclear, renewable and other energy industries, politicians, the green movement, 
the global warmists and other environmental pressure groups. Not to be ignored 
is the desire to dominate the world geopolitics by the energy producing 
countries, who will not welcome shale gas as a competitor. 
In the EU, it will be the political will and the strength of individual governments 
to make a U-turn, abandon the expensive and mostly futile renewable energy 
initiatives and start with shale gas exploitation. The priority that EU places on 
energy security may be sufficient to overcome the opposition. 
 
 
                                                            
5 In 1923 German scientists Franz Fischer and Hans Tropsch discovered that synthesis gas can be 
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